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“Censorship always defeats it own purpose, for it creates in the 
end the kind of society that is incapable of exercising real 
discretion.” 
— Henry Steele Commager, Historian 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The voting public justifiably takes for granted the ability to 
freely gather information about election candidates.  After all, 
voters are flooded with information concerning candidates from all 
sources, and have a plentiful supply of resources to research if they 
feel they need more.  This is certainly the case with elections 
regarding the legislative and executive branches, but should it be 
any different when the candidates are judges to the highest courts 
in the state?  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reviewed 
a Free Speech/Equal Protection case in which the plaintiff was a 
judicial candidate for the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the 
defendant was the Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards.1  In 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly,2 Greg Wersal, a Minneapolis 
 
 †  Duke University, B.S. Mechanical Engineering 1994; William Mitchell 
College of Law, J.D. anticipated May 2003.   
 1. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 854 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 2. Id. 
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attorney running for the Minnesota Supreme Court, encountered 
the provisions of Canon 5 of Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct.  
The court considered whether that canon violated the free speech 
and association guarantees inherent in the First Amendment and 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3  The 
court, inconsistently with a prior appellate decision,4 erroneously 
ruled that such provisions do not violate the United States 
Constitution.5 
This article first examines the facts of Kelly.6  It then explores 
the history leading up to the American Bar Association’s current 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, with a further look at the history 
of Minnesota’s judicial code.7  Next, the piece analyzes and 
comments on the Eighth Circuit Court’s decision.8  Finally, the 
article concludes that the court has ruled not only inconsistently 
with prior appellate rulings, but also unfairly with regard to the 
rights of judicial candidates, and more importantly, the rights of 
the electorate.9 
II. THE FACTS 
In 1996, Greg Wersal, a Minneapolis attorney and member of 
the Republican Party of Minnesota, campaigned for the office of 
Associate Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court.10  The same 
year, the Minnesota Supreme Court revised the Minnesota Code of 
Judicial Conduct, reorganizing the individual canons to bring the 
code essentially in line with the 1990 version of the ABA Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct.11  Of the revisions the Minnesota 
Supreme Court made in revised Canon 5,12 one was to allow 
 
 3. Id. at 860. 
 4. See Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, 997 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
 5. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 885. 
 6. See infra, Part II. 
 7. See infra, Part III. 
 8. See infra, Part IV. 
 9. See infra, Part V. 
 10. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 857. 
 11. Id. at 857-58. 
 12. The text of Canon 5, A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain from Political 
Activity Inappropriate to Judicial Office, is as follows: 
A. In General. 
Each justice of the supreme court and each court of appeals and district 
court judge is deemed to hold a separate nonpartisan office.  MINN STAT 
§ 204B.06 Subd 6. 
2
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(1)  Except as authorized in Section 5B(1), a judge or a candidate for 
election to judicial office shall not: 
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization; identify 
themselves as members of a political organization, except as necessary to 
vote in an election. 
(b) publicly endorse or, except for the judge or candidate’s opponent, 
publicly oppose another candidate for public office; 
(c) make speeches on behalf of a political organization; 
(d) attend political gatherings; or seek, accept or use endorsements from 
a political organization; or 
(e) solicit funds for or pay an assessment to or make a contribution to a 
political organization or candidate, or purchase tickets for political party 
dinners or other functions. 
(2)  A judge shall resign the judicial office on becoming a candidate 
either in a primary or in a general election for a non-judicial office, 
except that a judge may continue to hold judicial office while being a 
candidate for election to or serving as a delegate in a state constitutional 
convention, if the judge is otherwise permitted by law to do so. 
(3)  A candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge: 
(a) shall maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office and act in a 
manner consistent with the integrity and independence of the judiciary, 
and shall encourage family members to adhere to the same standards of 
political conduct in support of the candidate as apply to the candidate; 
(b) shall prohibit employees who serve at the pleasure of the candidate, 
and shall discourage other employees and officials subject to the 
candidate’s direction and control from doing on the candidate’s behalf 
what the candidate is prohibited from doing under the Sections of this 
Canon; 
(c) except to the extent permitted by Section 5B(2), shall not authorize 
or knowingly permit any other person to do for the candidate what the 
candidate is prohibited from doing under the Sections of this Canon; 
(d) shall not: 
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful 
and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his or 
her views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his or her 
identity, qualifications, present position or other fact, or those of the 
opponent; and 
(ii) by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice inappropriate to 
judicial office. 
(e) may respond to statements made during a campaign for judicial 
office within the limitations of Section 5A(3)(d). 
B.  Judges and Candidates For Public Election. 
(1)  A judge or a candidate for election to judicial office may, except as 
prohibited by law, 
(a) speak to gatherings, other than political organization gatherings, on 
his or her own behalf; 
(b) appear in newspaper, television and other media advertisements 
supporting his or her candidacy; and 
(c) distribute pamphlets and other promotional campaign literature 
supporting his or her candidacy. 
(2)  A candidate shall not personally solicit or accept campaign 
contributions or solicit publicly stated support.  A candidate may, 
3
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“candidates and judges to speak on their own behalf to gatherings 
generally, while another prohibited candidates and incumbents 
from attending political events.”13  Wersal and his wife, Cheryl, 
spoke at Republican Party gatherings during Wersal’s 1996 
campaign, announcing Wersal’s membership in the Republican 
Party and his support for a strict constructionist view of the 
Constitution.14  Through distribution of campaign literature, they 
also criticized several Minnesota Supreme Court decisions 
concerning crime, welfare, and abortion.15  In May, a delegate to 
the Republican district convention filed an ethics complaint against 
Wersal with the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility.16  The 
complaint questioned, among other things, Wersal’s presence at 
Republican gatherings and the distribution of campaign literature 
 
however, establish committees to conduct campaigns for the candidate 
through media advertisements, brochures, mailings, candidate forums 
and other means not prohibited by law.  Such committees may solicit and 
accept campaign contributions, manage the expenditure of funds for the 
candidate’s campaign and obtain public statements of support for his or 
her candidacy.  Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting and 
accepting campaign contributions and public support from lawyers, but 
shall not seek, accept or use political organization endorsements.  Such 
committees shall not disclose to the candidate the identity of campaign 
contributors nor shall the committee disclose to the candidate the 
identity of those who were solicited for contribution or stated public 
support and refused such solicitation.  A candidate shall not use or 
permit the use of campaign contributions for the private benefit of the 
candidate or others. 
C.  Incumbent Judges.  A judge shall not engage in any political activity 
except (1) as authorized under any other Section of this Code, (2) on 
behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system or the 
administration of justice, or (3) as expressly authorized by law. 
D.  Political Organization.  For purposes of Canon 5 the term political 
organization denotes a political party organization. 
E.  Applicability.  Canon 1, Canon 2(A), and Canon 5 generally applies to 
all incumbent judges and judicial candidates.  A successful candidate, 
whether or not an incumbent, is subject to judicial discipline for his or 
her campaign conduct; an unsuccessful candidate who is a lawyer is 
subject to lawyer discipline for his or her campaign conduct.  A lawyer 
who is a candidate for judicial office is subject to Rule 8.2 of the 
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. 
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2000). 
 13. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 858. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  The Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility investigates and 
prosecutes ethical violations of attorney candidates for judicial office under the 
direction of the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board. 
4
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critical of Minnesota Supreme Court decisions.17  The Director of 
the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board dismissed 
the complaint, finding no disciplinary action was necessary under 
Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.18  The Director’s written 
determination noted several things.  First, it was not clear whether 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 1996 revision of the Code retained 
the ban on candidates speaking to political gatherings.19  Second, 
the Director also questioned whether the “announce clause”20 was 
even applicable to Wersal’s statements, or regardless of 
applicability, whether it was enforceable, considering numerous 
decisions from other jurisdictions striking down or narrowly 
interpreting similar language.21  After receiving this notification, 
Wersal withdrew his candidacy for the 1996 race.22  In January of 
the following year, he announced his candidacy for an upcoming 
1998 supreme court vacancy.23  The Minnesota Board on Judicial 
Standards, in charge of enforcing ethical codes against judges and 
aware of Wersal’s solicitation of the Republican Party endorsement, 
petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court in September of 1997 to 
amend Canon 5.24  The Board wanted to add language limiting the 
ability of candidates to “identify themselves as members of a 
political organization” as well as clarifying that “judicial candidates 
could not speak to political gatherings.”25  The supreme court 
adopted these recommendations and ordered an amendment of 
 
 17. Id.  The complaint also inquired into the solicitation of partisan support 
by the campaign committee.  Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 858-859. 
 20. Id at 859.  What is commonly referred to as the “announce clause” is the 
phrase in Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) which states “a candidate for judicial office shall 
not . . . announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”  
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000). 
 21. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 859. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.  In 1998, Greg Wersal and Roger Peterson filed for the seat held by 
justice Alan Page.  Page and Peterson advanced to the general election.  
Minnesota State Bar Association, 1998-99 Annual Reports, at 
http://www2.mnbar.org/reports/99annual.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2001).  
Wersal also ran against Minnesota Supreme Court justice James Gilbert in 2000, 
but lost 69% to 31%.  Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, 2000 – Minnesota 
General Election, Judicial Results (2000), at 
http://elections.sos.state.mn.us/ENR2000_General/ElecRslts.asp?M=J&P=A (last 
modified Dec. 12, 2000). 
 24. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 859. 
 25. Id. 
5
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Canon 5, effective January 1, 1998.26 
In February 1998, Wersal sought an advisory opinion from the 
Lawyers Board concerning whether he might be prosecuted for 
ethical violations for speaking at a political party gathering or 
obtaining a Republican Party endorsement, and also whether the 
Board would enforce the Canon 5 provision that restricted 
candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or 
political issues.27  As for speaking at political party gatherings and 
obtaining the Republican Party endorsement, the Director of the 
Board stated that the Board would indeed subject Wersal to 
discipline.28  However, because Wersal had not provided the Board 
with specific statements he might make regarding his views on 
disputed issues, the Board could not specifically advise him, adding 
that, “the Board continued to have ‘significant doubts as to 
whether or not [the announce clause] would survive a facial 
challenge to its constitutionality’ and that it would not enforce the 
provision unless the speech at issue violated other portions of the 
judicial ethics code.”29 
Shortly after receiving this advisory opinion, Wersal filed a 
complaint30 seeking “declaratory and injunctive relief from the 
provisions of Canon 5.”31  The complaint asserted that Canon 5 
violated the First Amendment’s free speech and association 
guarantees and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.32  Wersal moved for a “temporary restraining order and/or 
preliminary injunction to enjoin the Lawyers Board and Judicial 
Board from enforcing Canon 5” so Wersal could participate in 
Republican caucuses coming up in March 1998.33  The district 
court denied that motion34 and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. The initial complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Id.  Other 
plaintiffs who file suit involving the issue of First Amendment free speech and 
association and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection in the context of relief 
from the provisions of judicial codes have likewise file under section 1983.  See 
Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1228 (M.D.Ala. 
2000); Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693, 696 (N.D.Ohio 1996); Stretton v. 
Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 763 F. Supp. 128, 129 (E.D.Pa. 
1991), vacated in part by 944 F.2d. 137 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 31. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 859. 
 32. Id. at 860. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 996 F. Supp. 875, 880 (D.Minn. 
6
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Circuit subsequently affirmed that decision.35  While awaiting the 
appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Wersal canceled numerous speeches 
scheduled at various Republican events and declined answering 
specific questions asked of him by the press and public for fear that 
answering might unveil his views on disputed legal or political 
issues.36 
Pertaining to the prohibition of a candidate’s attending or 
speaking at political gatherings, the district court found for the 
defendants,37 concluding Minnesota had a  “compelling interest in 
maintaining the actual and apparent integrity and independence 
of its judiciary”38 and that the bans on candidates’ political activity 
and fund solicitation were narrowly tailored to serve those interests 
because “[a]lternative means exist through which voters may obtain 
information concerning judicial candidates.”39  Concerning the 
announce clause, the district court cited other jurisdictions that 
found that “the state has a compelling interest in limiting the First 
Amendment rights of judicial candidates in order to maintain the 
actual and apparent impartiality and independence of the 
judiciary.”40  The critical issue again for the court was whether that 
provision was “narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interest in 
maintaining the integrity and independence of the judiciary” and 
interpreted the clause to reach only the candidate’s discussion of 
issues “likely to come before the court.”41  The court likewise found the 
announce clause did not unnecessarily restrict protected speech.42 
 
1998). 
 35. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, No. 98-1625, 1998 WL 764782, at 
*1 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 1998). 
 36. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 860. 
 37. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 986 (D. Minn. 
1999).  The primary defendant was Verna Kelly, Chairperson of the Minnesota 
Board of Judicial Standards.  Id. 
 38. Id. at 980. 
 39. Id.  Presumably, Judge Davis is referring to Canon 5(B)(1)(c), in which 
candidates may “distribute pamphlets and other promotional campaign literature 
supporting his or her candidacy.” MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(B)(1)(c) (2000). 
 40. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 984. 
 41. Id. at 986 (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. 
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III. HISTORY 
A.  American Bar Association 
The American Bar Association first devised ethical guidelines 
for judges in 1924, with thirty-six “Canons of Judicial Ethics” 
drafted by a committee headed by Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft.43 
In terms of speech, Canon 28 provided that candidates 
“should avoid making political speeches.”44  Judges were to avoid 
giving speeches that advanced the cause of a particular party, but 
were free to speak about current political issues as long as no 
obvious party connection was evident.45  Similarly, Canon 30 
provided that a candidate for judicial office “should not announce 
in advance his conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure class 
support.”46  While these canons were not intended to be a basis for 
disciplinary action, the ABA replaced the original canons with a 
new Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 1972 that was designed to 
be enforceable.47  However, the range of acceptable political talk 
was greatly curtailed by the introduction of wording in the new 
Canon 7 that candidates could not announce their views on 
“disputed political issues.”48  Restrictions on discussion of legal 
issues were also imposed, with judicial candidates prohibited from 
announcing their views on “disputed legal issues.”49  The Special 
 
 43. THEODORE J. BOUTROS, JR. ET AL., STATE JUDICIARIES AND IMPARTIALITY: 
JUDGING THE JUDGES 121 (Roger Clegg & James. D. Miller eds., 1996). 
 44. PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL 
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS  86 (1990); Canon 28 also required judges to avoid “making 
or soliciting payments of assessments or contributions to party funds, the public 
endorsement of candidates for political office and participation in party 
conventions.”  ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 28 (1924).  After a 1933 
amendment, Canon 28 prohibited judges from “generally engaging in partisan 
activities and, more specifically, from serving as a party committee member or 
party leader.”  LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 45 
(1992). 
 45. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1924). 
 46. MCFADDEN, supra note 44, at 86.  Further, a candidate for judicial position 
“should do nothing while a candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he 
will administer his office with bias, partiality or improper discrimination.”  ABA 
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1924). 
 47. BOUTROS, supra note 43, 121. 
 48. MCFADDEN, supra note 44, at 86.  This provision is within Canon 7B(1)(c) 
of the 1972 Code.  See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972). 
 49. MCFADDEN, supra note 44, at 86. 
8
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Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct felt a judicial 
candidate could not run a campaign based on a platform of 
partiality for specific groups, nor could he commit himself in 
advance of a judicial ruling on disputed legal issues, nor 
misrepresent himself.50  The Committee further believed that 
candidates should not base campaigns on their views of disputed 
political issues but should instead focus on their ability, experience 
and record.51 
The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility began to revise the 1972 Code in 1986.52  The 
decision to revise Canon 7 of the 1972 Code stemmed from the 
failure to provide sufficient guidance concerning the political 
conduct of judges and candidates, principally because of the 
various selection methods for judges throughout the jurisdictions.53  
What emerged from the Committee was a new Canon 5, addressing 
four areas pertinent to both judicial candidates and sitting judges.  
Canon 5A addressed issues common to the political conduct of 
judges and judicial candidates regardless of method of judicial 
selection, Canon 5B focused on issues unique to candidates subject 
to appointment, Canon 5C to issues exclusive to sitting judges and 
candidates subject to public elections, and finally Canon 5D dealt 
with issues relating to the political activity of incumbent judges.54  
In August 1990 the ABA House of Delegates adopted these 
revisions, including the addition of a preamble explaining the 
function of the code.55 
As discussed above, Canon 5 of the 1990 Model code of 
Judicial Conduct has four sections, of which section 5A concerns 
rules related to free speech.  Section 5A(3)(d) makes significant 
 
 50. E.WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 98 
(1973). 
 51. Id. 
 52. BOUTROS, supra note 43, at 121. 
 53. MILORD, supra note 44, at 46-7.  Methods cited include merit selection, 
nonpartisan and partisan elections, executive or legislative appointments, and 
court selection.  Id. 
 54. MILORD, supra note 44, at 47.  The Committee first attempted to draft a 
Canon with three alternative sets of rules for the merit system, public elections, 
and appointment of judges, however the Committee found this version too 
repetitive.  It then attempted a unified rule but was severely criticized for not 
addressing issues unique to specific methods of judicial selection, including 
concerns related to political speech in public elections.  The final draft was a 
hybrid of those earlier efforts.  Id. 
 55. BOUTROS, supra note 43, at 122. 
9
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modifications from Canon 7 of the 1972 Code.  The prohibition 
against a candidate announcing his or her views on disputed legal 
or political issues was replaced with language that a candidate shall 
not “make statements that commit or appear to commit the 
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are 
likely to come before the court.”56  The Committee thought this 
wording would be more amenable to constitutional guarantees of 
free speech, while still “preventing the harm that can come from 
statements damaging the appearance of judicial integrity and 
impartiality.”57  The Committee also believed the language in the 
1972 Code could not “be practically applied in its literal terms.”58 
In terms of political gatherings, the original Canon 28 of the 
1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics stated that “[the judge] should 
avoid making political speeches, making or soliciting payment 
assessments or contributions to party funds, the public 
endorsement of candidates for political office and participation in 
party conventions.”59  The 1933 amendment added a second 
paragraph to the effect that judges should not engage in partisan 
activities.60  In 1950, the ABA added a final sentence to Canon 28: 
Where however, it is necessary for judges to be nominated 
and elected as candidates of a political party, nothing 
herein contained shall prevent the judge from attending 
or speaking at political gatherings, or from making 
contributions to the campaign funds of the party that has 
nominated him and seeks his election or re-election.61 
The 1972 revisions affirmed that thinking: 
A judge holding an office filled by public election . . . or a 
candidate for such office, may, only insofar as permitted 
by law, attend political gatherings, speak to such 
gatherings on his own behalf when he is a candidate for 
election or re-election, identify himself as a member of a 
political party, and contribute to a political party or 
organization.62 
 
 56. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d) (1990). 
 57. MILORD, supra note 44, at 50. 
 58. Id. 
 59. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 28 (1924). 
 60. MILORD, supra note 44, at 140.  Specifically, “[h]e should neither accept 
nor retain a place on a party committee nor act as a party leader, nor engage 
generally in partisan activities.”  Id. 
 61. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS AMENDMENT TO Canon 28 (1950). 
 62. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(2) (1972). 
10
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Of course, the “law” referenced above is established by either 
statutory or common law of the jurisdiction of the particular 
candidate since there is nothing within the Code itself suggesting 
those parameters.63 
Section 5C(1) of the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
revised the 1972 Code, applying those provisions to judges and 
judicial candidates in all types of judicial elections (partisan, 
nonpartisan, and retention).64 
B.  Minnesota 
The methods of judicial selection in each jurisdiction are 
varied65 and the canons or codes of judicial ethics of these states 
 
 63. THODE, supra note 50, at 96-7. 
 64. MILORD, supra note 44, at 52. 
 65. For each state’s supreme court provisions, see LYLE WARRICK, JUDICIAL 
SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS (2nd ed. 1993).  
Alabama: judicial selection and retention through partisan elections; Alaska: 
selects judges through appointment by the governor, retention by nonpartisan 
election; Arizona: selection through appointment, retention through nonpartisan 
election; Arkansas: Both initial selection and retention are through nonpartisan 
elections (updated information from American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection 
Methods in the States, at http://www.ajs.org/select11.html (last visited Jan. 31, 
2002); California: initial appointment by governor, retained at the next general 
election after appointment by nonpartisan ballot, running unopposed; Colorado: 
initial appointment by governor, retention upon proper filing of declaration and 
majority vote at general election; Connecticut: nominated by the governor and 
appointed by the general assembly; retention is by nomination for reappointment 
and incumbent judges seeking reappointment to the same court are presumed 
qualified with the burden of rebutting that presumption on the judicial selection 
commission; Delaware: initial selection and retention through  gubernatorial 
appointment; District of Columbia: initial selection through nomination by the 
President and consent by the Senate; retention through a filed declaration of 
candidacy and review by the Tenure Commission; Florida: initial appointment by 
the governor with a nonpartisan retention vote; Georgia: initial selection and 
retention by nonpartisan election; Hawaii: initial selection by appointment of the 
governor with retention through petition to the Judicial Selection Commission; 
Idaho: initial selection and retention by nonpartisan election; Illinois: Initial 
selection at general or judicial elections by partisan ballot, retention through 
declaration of candidacy and nonpartisan election; Indiana: initial selection by 
governor appointment, retention by general election; Iowa: initial selection by 
governor appointment with a retention ballot at the next judicial election; Kansas: 
initial selection through nonpartisan appointment by the governor, retention by 
election on a nonpartisan ballot; Kentucky: initial selection and retention by 
nonpartisan election; Louisiana: initial selection and retention through partisan 
elections; Maine: initial selection and retention through gubernatorial 
appointment subject to review by the Joint Standing Committee on the Judiciary; 
Maryland: initial selection through appointment by the governor with an 
uncontested retention election; Massachusetts: initial selection through 
11
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nomination and appointment by the governor, retention not applicable due to the 
nature of the judges’ terms; Michigan: initial selection and retention through 
partisan elections (updated information from American Judicature Society, 
Judicial Selection Methods in the States, at http://www.ajs.org/select11.html (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2002).  While party affiliations are not listed on the ballots 
candidates usually run with party endorsements.  Id.; Minnesota: initial selection 
and retention using nonpartisan elections; Mississippi: initial selection and 
retention through partisan elections; Missouri: initial selection through 
appointment by the governor, retention through separate nonpartisan judicial 
ballot; Montana: initial selection by nonpartisan election, retention through 
reelection either against an opponent or solely on the question of retention or 
rejection; Nebraska: initial selection by the governor, retention through 
nonpartisan uncontested ballot; Nevada: initial selection and retention through 
nonpartisan election; New Hampshire: initial selection through nomination, with 
all judicial officers serving during good behavior until mandatory retirement at 
seventy; New Jersey: initial selection through appointment by the governor, 
retention through reappointment; New Mexico: initial selection through 
appointment by the governor, first retention election on a partisan ballot, 
subsequent retention elections by nonpartisan ballot; New York: initial selection 
and retention through appointment by the governor; North Carolina: initial 
selection and retention through partisan elections; North Dakota: initial selection 
and retention through nonpartisan elections; Ohio: initial selection and retention 
through partisan elections(updated information from American Judicature 
Society, Judicial Selection Methods in the States, at http://www.ajs.org/select11.html 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2002).  As in Michigan, party affiliation is not listed on the 
ballot.  Id.; Oklahoma: initial selection by appointment, retention through a 
uncontested nonpartisan ballot; Oregon: initial selection and retention through 
nonpartisan elections; Pennsylvania: initial selection by partisan election, 
retention through nonpartisan election; Rhode Island: initial selection by both 
legislative houses in grand committee, retention is for life based on good behavior; 
South Carolina: initial selection and retention by “joint public vote of the general 
assembly, from a list of nominees supplied by the judicial screening committee”; 
South Dakota: initial selection by gubernatorial appointment, retention through 
submittal to the electorate (no competitive elections); Tennessee: merit selection 
through nominating commission for appellate level, partisan elections on district 
level, retention through nonpartisan election (updated information from 
American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection Methods in the States, at 
http://www.ajs.org/select11.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2002); Texas: initial 
selection and retention by partisan election; Utah: initial selection through 
appointment by the governor, retention through an unopposed retention 
election; Vermont: initial selection by gubernatorial appointment, continuation in 
office unless voted out by the members of the general assembly; Virginia: initial 
selection and retention by “majority vote of both houses of the general assembly;” 
Washington: initial selection and retention through nonpartisan election; West 
Virginia: initial selection and retention through partisan elections; Wisconsin: 
initial selection and retention by nonpartisan election; Wyoming: initial selection 
through appointment by the governor, retention by nonpartisan uncontested 
judicial ballot.  Thus, the majority of states (twenty-one, including D.C.) use some 
form of gubernatorial appointments, nine states have partisan elections, twelve 
utilize nonpartisan elections, and nine combine methods.  American Judicature 
Society, Judicial Selection Methods in the States, at http://www.ajs.org/select11.html 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2002). 
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 66. The following is a listing of all state Canons or Codes of Judicial Ethics 
and their treatment of candidates’ abilities to discuss their views on legal or 
political issues: ALABAMA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2001) 
(stating that a candidate for office by either public election or on the basis of the 
merit system shall not announce in advance his or her conclusions of law on 
pending litigation). The commentary to Canon 7(B) mentions that candidates 
may appear and speak on their own behalf at any function organized in support of 
his or her candidacy.  Canon 7(B) cmt.; ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (“A candidate for judicial office shall not make statements 
that commit or appear to commit the candidate to a particular view or decision 
with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the 
court . . . .”).  This wording is identical to the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct; Canon 5(B)(1)(d)(ii) (2001); ARIZONA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
(echoing the “commit or appear to commit . . . likely to come before the court” 
language of the 1990 ABA Code); ARKANSAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (using the familiar “commit” language); CALIFORNIA CODE 
OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5(B) (2001) (stating a “candidate for election or 
appointment to judicial office shall not make statements to the electorate or the 
appointing authority that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect 
to cases, controversies, or issues that could come before the courts”); COLORADO 
RULES OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2000) (stating that a judge who is 
a candidate for retention should not “announce how the judge would rule on any 
case or issue that might come before the judge.”); Canon 7(C)(1) (“A judge may 
attend and participate in nonpartisan gatherings at which legal or social issues are 
addressed, provided that the judge shall neither discuss cases in which he or she 
has participated that are not yet final, nor state how the judge would rule on any 
case or issue that might come before him or her.”); The CONNECTICUT CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2000) does not have any provisions concerning statements 
regarding legal or political issues within its appellate court system; The DELAWARE 
JUDGES’ CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not refer to the issue of legal or 
political speech, likely due to the lack of judicial elections; FLORIDA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(C)(3) (2001) (stating that a judicial candidate 
involved in election or re-election should avoid “expressing a position on any 
political issue” or any “affiliation with any political party” when attending and 
speaking at a political party function); GEORGIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
7(B)(1)(c) (2001) (sustaining the identical “commit or appear to commit” 
language of the 1990 ABA Model Code); The HAWAII CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
(2001) does not specifically refer to matters of expression of political views; The 
IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not specifically refer to matters of 
expression of political views; ILLINOIS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 67 Canon 
7(A)(3)(d)(i) (2001) (expressing the ABA Model Code’s “commit” language); 
INDIANA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (reaffirming the 
ABA “commit” verbiage); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (“A 
judge who is a candidate for retention in judicial office . . . [s]hould not  . . . 
announce views on disputed legal or political issues”); KANSAS CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT R. 16-813 Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (restating the ABA 1990 Model 
Code “commit” language); KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(B)(1)(c) (1999) (echoing the ABA’s “commit” language); LOUISIANA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d)(ii) (2001) (reaffirming the 1990 ABA Code 
language); MAINE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(1)(b) (2000) (stating 
the 1990 ABA Code “commit” language for candidates seeking appointment to 
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judicial office); MARYLAND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(5) (2001) (“A 
judge who is a candidate for election, re-election, or retention to judicial office 
may engage in partisan political activity allowed by law with respect to such 
candidacy, except that the judge . . . should not . . .  announce the judge’s views on 
disputed legal or political issues . . . .”); The MASSACHUSETTS CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT (2001) does not specifically refer to matters of expression of political 
views; The MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not specifically refer 
to matters of expression of political views; MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000) (stating that a candidate shall not “announce his or 
her views on disputed legal or political issues”); MISSISSIPPI CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2001) (declaring that candidates should not 
announce their views on “disputed legal or political issues.”).  It is interesting to 
note that notwithstanding Canon 7’s “announce clause.”  Candidates may attend 
political gatherings, speak to those gatherings on their own behalf, identify 
themselves as members of a political party and contribute to political parties.  
Canon 7(A)(2); MISSOURI CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(1)(c) (2001) 
(stating that candidates shall not announce views on disputed legal issues).  Unlike 
other “announce clause” provisions, Missouri’s prohibits announcing views on 
legal issues, but does not reference political issues.  Id.; MONTANA CANONS OF 
JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1963), available at 
http://www.lawlibrary.state.mt.us/dscgi/ds.py/View/Collection-2931 (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2001) (restating the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics language that the 
candidate “should not announce in advance his conclusions of law on disputed 
issues to secure class support”); NEBRASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (repeating the 1990 ABA Code “commit” language for 
candidates seeking appointment to judicial office); NEVADA CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (restating the ABA 1990 Model Code 
“commit” language); The NEW HAMPSHIRE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does 
not refer to judicial candidates due to New Hampshire’s method of judicial 
selection; The NEW JERSEY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not refer to 
judicial candidates due to New Jersey’s method of judicial selection; NEW MEXICO 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 21-700(B)(4) (2000) (stating that candidates for 
judicial election shall not make statements that commit or appear to “commit the 
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come 
before the court” nor “announce how the candidate would rule on any case or 
issue that may come before the court”); NEW YORK CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(A)(4)(d)(ii) (2001) (restating the ABA’s 1990 “commit” language); The 
NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not contain a specific 
provision limiting a candidate’s ability to discuss legal or political issues or issues 
likely to come before the court; NORTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (repeating the 1990 ABA Model Code “commit” provision); 
OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2)(d) (2001) (stating the familiar 
“commit or appear to commit” language of the ABA Code); OKLAHOMA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (restating the ABA Code 
“commit” expression); The OREGON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1999) does not 
specifically limit candidates’ speech concerning legal or political issues; 
PENNSYLVANIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2001) (stating that a 
candidate should not “announce his views on disputed legal or political issues”); 
RHODE ISLAND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (using the 
ABA Code’s “commit or appear to commit” language); SOUTH CAROLINA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (restating the “commit” provision 
of the ABA Code); SOUTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
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5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (reaffirming the ABA Code’s “commit or appear to 
commit” language); TENNESSEE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) 
(2001) (using the ABA “commit or appear to commit” verbiage); TEXAS CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(1) (2001) (“A judge or judicial candidate shall not 
make statements that indicate an opinion on any issue that may be subject to 
judicial interpretation by the office which is being sought or held, except that 
discussion of an individual’s judicial philosophy is appropriate if conducted in a 
manner which does not suggest to a reasonable person a probable decision on any 
particular case.”).  Likewise, a “judge or judicial candidate may . . . express his or 
her views on political matters.”  Canon 5(3); UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(B)(4) (2000) (stating that candidates who have been confirmed by the 
senate shall not “take a public position on a non-partisan political issue which 
would jeopardize the confidence of the public in the impartiality of the judicial 
system.”).  Utah’s Code also contains a blanket statement directing candidates for 
selection by the judicial nominating commission not to “engage in political 
activities that would jeopardize the confidence of the public or of governmental 
officials in the political impartiality of the judicial branch of government” Canon 
5(A); VERMONT CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(4)(b) (2000) (restating 
the familiar ABA language of making statements that “commit or appear to 
commit” them to issues “likely to come before the court); The CANONS OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT FOR THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, (2000) do not stipulate provisions for 
candidates announcing views on legal or political issues due to Virginia’s method 
of judicial selection; WASHINGTON CODE OF JUDICIAL  CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (using the ABA Code’s “commit” language); WEST VIRGINIA 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (reaffirming the ABA 
Code “commit or appear to commit” language); The WISCONSIN CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT, R. 60.06(3) (2001) does not presently specifically mention a limit on a 
non-incumbent candidate’s ability to announce his or her views on legal or 
political issues, but does prohibit a judge from doing anything that “would commit 
the judge or appear to commit the judge in advance with respect to any particular 
case or controversy or which suggests that, if elected or chosen, the judge would 
administer his or her office with partiality, bias or favor.”; WYOMING CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (using the “commit or appear to 
commit” language of the 1990 ABA Model Code). 
 67. The following is a listing of all state Canons or Codes of Judicial Ethics 
and their treatment of candidates’ abilities concerning attendance and/or speech 
at political gatherings: ALABAMA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7(A)(1) 
(2001).  This provision explains in pertinent part that 
so long as judges are subject to nomination and election as candidates of 
a political party, it is realized that a judge or a candidate for election to a 
judicial office cannot divorce himself or herself completely from political 
organizations and campaign activities which, indirectly or directly, may 
be involved in his or her election or re-election.  Nevertheless, should a 
judge or a candidate for a judicial position be directly or indirectly 
involved in the internal workings or campaign activities of a political 
organization, it is imperative that he or she at all times conduct himself 
or herself in such a manner as to prevent any political considerations, 
entanglements, or influences from ever becoming involved in or from 
ever appearing to be involved in any judicial decision or in the judicial 
process. 
Id.; ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000) (requiring all 
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judges and candidates for appointment to judicial office not attend political 
gatherings unless he or she is a non-judge candidate); ARIZONA CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2001) (“A judge or a candidate for election to 
judicial office shall not actively take part in any political campaign other than his 
or her own election, reelection or retention in office”); Canon 5(A)(2) (“A judge 
or a non-judge who is a candidate for judicial office may speak to political 
gatherings on his or her own behalf.”); ARKANSAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2001) (judges and candidates shall not attend political 
gatherings unless a non-judge candidate for appointment to judicial office or a 
candidate subject to public election.  A judge or candidate subject to public 
election may identify himself or herself as a political party member and when a 
candidate speak to gatherings on his or her own behalf); CALIFORNIA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5(C) (2001) (“Candidates for judicial office may speak at 
political gatherings only on their behalf or on behalf of another candidate for 
judicial office.”); COLORADO RULES OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE Canon 7(B)(2) (2000) 
(declaring that a judicial candidate for retention in office should abstain from 
campaign activity in connection with his or her own candidacy unless there is 
active opposition to that judge’s retention in office, in which case the candidate 
may request the organization of a nonpartisan committee advocating his or her 
retention); Canon 7(C) (stating that the judge may “attend and participate in 
nonpartisan gatherings at which legal or social issues are addressed.”); 
CONNECTICUT CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7(a)(3) (2000) (declaring that a 
judge should not attend political gatherings (because Connecticut does not have 
judicial elections.  WARRICK, supra note 65.)); The DELAWARE JUDGES’ CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not refer to the issue of candidates attending 
political gatherings, likely due to the lack of judicial elections; FLORIDA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7(A)(1)(d) (2001) (declaring a judge or candidate 
shall not attend political party functions unless a non-judge candidate for 
appointment to judicial office or unless involved in election or re-election.  
However, any invitation to speak at a political party function must include all other 
candidates for that office and the candidate should not comment on his or her 
affiliation with that political party.  Also, any candidate attending a political party 
function “must avoid conduct that suggests or appears to suggest support or 
opposition to a political party, a political issue, or another candidate”); GEORGIA 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(2) (2001) (“Judges holding an office filled 
by public election between competing candidates, or candidates for such office, 
may attend political gatherings and speak to such gatherings on their own behalf 
when they are candidates for election or re-election.”); HAWAII CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2001) (stating that a judge or candidate shall not 
attend political gatherings).  The commentary further mentions that those judges 
and candidates retain the right to “participate in the political process as a voter.” 
Canon 5(A)(1)(2001) cmt.; The IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A) 
(2001) does not specifically disallow attendance or speech at political events, but 
retains the 1990 ABA Model Code’s prohibition on making speeches for political 
organizations (the ABA Code does, however, allow this practice in certain 
circumstances for candidates subject to public election, ABA MODEL CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(A)(1)(c) (1990); ILLINOIS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
R. 67 Canon 7(B)(1)(a)(i),(ii) (2001) (“A judge or candidate may . . . attend 
political gatherings; identify himself or herself as a member of a political party;”); 
Canon 7(B)(1)(b)(i) (2001) (stating that when a candidate for public election, he 
or she may “speak to gatherings on his or her own behalf”;) INDIANA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2001) (directing that candidates shall not 
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attend gatherings of political organizations unless a candidate subject to public 
election); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(1)(c) (2001) (stating that 
judges should not attend political gatherings (no provision concerning political 
gatherings directly applies to candidates)); KANSAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (directing that candidates may attend political gatherings 
unless a nonjudge candidate for appointment to judicial office or subject to public 
election (in which case the candidate may permit his or her name to be “listed on 
election materials.”); KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(2) (1999) 
(stating that a judge or a candidate for election may purchase tickets to and attend 
political gatherings and may speak to such gatherings on the candidate’s own 
behalf, however, a candidate cannot identify himself or herself as a member of a 
political party when speaking to a gathering.  If not initiated by the candidate for 
such office, and only in answer to a direct question, the judge or candidate may 
identify himself or herself as a member of a particular political party); LOUISIANA 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(C) (2001) (stating that judicial candidates 
may at any time attend political gatherings, identify themselves as members of 
political parties and speak to gatherings on their own behalf); MAINE CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000) (declaring that incumbent judges 
shall not attend political gatherings (no comparable provision exists for 
candidates seeking appointment)); MARYLAND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(B) (2001) (declaring that judges who are candidates for election, re-election, or 
retention to judicial office are allowed to engage in partisan political activities (no 
condition, therefore, details attendance at political gatherings)); MASSACHUSETTS 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(1)(c) (2001) (affirming that a judge 
should not attend political gatherings (the lack of candidate provisions is expected 
given Massachusetts’ judicial selection process, see supra note 65)); MICHIGAN CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(2) (2001) (stating that a judge or candidate 
may both attend political gatherings and speak to those gatherings); MINNESOTA 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000) (declaring that candidates 
shall not attend political gatherings); MISSISSIPPI CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 7(A)(1)(c) (2001) (affirming a candidate should not attend political 
gatherings unless a candidate for office filled by public election); MISSOURI CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(2) (2001) (“Where it is necessary that a judge 
be nominated and elected as a candidate of a political party, an incumbent judge 
or candidate for election to judicial office may attend or speak on the judge or 
candidate’s own behalf at political gatherings . . . .”); MONTANA CANONS OF 
JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 28 (1963) available at 
http://www.lawlibrary.state.mt.us/dscgi/ds.py/View/Collection-2931 (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2001) (restating the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics language that the 
candidate “should avoid making political speeches . . . and participation in party 
conventions.”); NEBRASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000) 
(stating that candidates shall not attend political gatherings unless a “non-judge 
candidate for appointment to judicial office” or a candidate subject to retention 
election); NEVADA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(1)(a)(i) (2001) 
(declaring that candidates subject to public election may attend political 
gatherings).  The 2000 amendment to this canon permits candidates to identify 
their political party membership upon request but cannot align themselves with 
political parties.  Canon 5(C)(1) cmt.; The NEW HAMPSHIRE CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT (2001) does not refer to judicial candidates due to New Hampshire’s 
method of judicial selection; The NEW JERSEY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) 
does not refer to judicial candidates due to New Jersey’s method of judicial 
selection (although judges are not to “attend political functions that are likely to 
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be considered as being political in nature).  Canon 7(A)(3); NEW MEXICO CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 21-700(B) (2000) (“Candidates for election to judicial office 
in partisan, nonpartisan and retention elections, including judges, lawyers and 
non-lawyers, are permitted to participate in the electoral process . . . [all 
candidates] may speak at public meetings,” but in a nonpartisan election may not 
use advertising containing any reference to his or her affiliation with a political 
party).  Incumbent judges may attend political gatherings and identify themselves 
as members of political parties.  R. 21-700(A)(2); NEW YORK CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(g) (2001) (reaffirming a candidate for election to 
judicial office shall not “directly or indirectly engage in any political activity” 
including attending political gatherings).  Of course, a judge or non-judge who is 
a candidate for a judicial office via public election may “purchase two tickets to, 
and attend, politically sponsored dinners and other functions.”  Canon 
5(A)(2)(v); NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(2) (2001) 
(“A judge holding an office filled by public election between competing 
candidates, or a candidate for such office, may attend political gatherings, speak to 
such gatherings, identify himself as a member of a political party, and contribute 
to a political party or organization.”); NORTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(A)(1)(f) (2001) (declaring that candidates for election shall not attend 
political gatherings unless subject to public election, in which case he or she may 
“speak on behalf of his or her own candidacy . . . whether or not at a gathering 
sponsored by a political organization;”); OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
7(B)(3) (2001) (declaring that judicial candidates may “attend political gatherings 
and speak to political gatherings.”).  Candidates may also identify themselves as 
members of political parties.  Canon 7(B)(3)(b)-(c); The OKLAHOMA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not specifically restrain judicial candidates subject 
to public election from attending political gatherings; The OREGON CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT JR 4-102(C) (1999) (explaining that candidates cannot publicly 
identify themselves as members of a political party “other than by registering to 
vote”); PENNSYLVANIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(2) (2001) (stating 
that candidates for election to judicial office should not attend political gatherings 
unless he or she is “[a] judge holding an office filled by public election between 
competing candidates, or a candidate for such office” in which case he or she may 
attend, speak, and identify himself or herself as a member of a political party); 
RHODE ISLAND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2001) 
(pronouncing that all candidates shall not attend political gatherings unless a non-
judge candidate seeking appointment to judicial office); SOUTH CAROLINA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000) (proclaiming that candidates shall 
not attend political gatherings unless a “non-judge candidate for appointment to 
judicial office” or a candidate “subject to public election”); SOUTH DAKOTA CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000) (forbidding candidates to attend 
political gatherings unless a non-judge candidate or subject to public election); 
TENNESSEE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(C)(1)(i) (2001) (allowing 
candidates to attend political gatherings); TEXAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(3) (2001) (“A judge or judicial candidate may attend political events and 
express his or her views on political matters in accord with this Canon . . . .”); 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(3) (2000) (mandating that 
candidates for judicial office already confirmed by the Senate shall not attend 
political gatherings).  In terms of candidates still subject to selection by the 
nominating commission, Utah’s Code provides a blanket statement that those 
candidates “shall not engage in political activities that would jeopardize the 
confidence of the public or of governmental officials in the political impartiality of 
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of the ABA Code.  The vast majority of changes states do make to 
the Model Code concern the political activity of judges.68 
In 1950, the Minnesota District Judges Association adopted the 
American Bar Association’s 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics.69  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court in 1974 promulgated a revised code of 
ethics based largely on the 1972 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct.70  
In 1993, the Minnesota Supreme Court established the Minnesota 
Supreme Court Advisory Committee to Review the American Bar 
Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of the 
Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards to evaluate the 1990 ABA 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of the Minnesota 
Board on Judicial Standards.71 
Among the proposals set forth was a suggested Canon 
5(A)(3)(d) that “[r]eplaces [the] previous blanket prohibition 
against announcing views on disputed legal or political issues with 
[a] prohibition against making statements that commit or appear 
to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or 
 
the judicial branch of government”  Canon 5(A).  Further, those candidates shall 
not “seek support or invite opposition to the candidacy because of membership in 
a political party.”  Canon 5(A)(3); VERMONT CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(B)(4)(e) (2000) (forbidding candidates for appointment or confirmation or 
retention from engaging in any political activity to obtain the appointment, except 
that those candidates may seek support and endorsement from organizations and 
if not they are not an incumbent judge, they may participate in political caucuses 
and meetings); The CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, 
(2000) do not specify attendance at political gatherings for candidates due to 
Virginia’s judicial selection method, however, sitting judges shall not attend such 
gatherings, Canon 5(A)(1)(c); WASHINGTON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(1)(d) (2000) (stating that all candidates shall not attend gatherings of 
political organizations unless a non-judge candidate who is appointed or a 
candidate subject to public election); WEST VIRGINIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(C)(1)(a) (2001) (allowing candidates to attend political gatherings and 
identify themselves as members of a political party); The WISCONSIN CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not presently specifically limit candidate’s 
attendance at political gatherings, but does prohibit judges from participating in 
political party affairs, see R. 60.06(2), however, judges may attend a political 
meeting as a member of the public but not as a participant, see Commentary to 
Rule 60.06(2); WYOMING CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000) 
(disallowing candidates to attend political gatherings unless a non-judge candidate 
for appointment to judicial office or a candidate subject to public election). 
 68. MCFADDEN, supra note 44, at 14. 
 69. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Final Report, Advisory Committee to Review the American Bar 
Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of the Minnesota 
Board on Judicial Standards 1 (1994) [hereinafter “Advisory Committee”]. 
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issues that are likely to come before the court.”72  The committee 
was wary of constitutional issues arising from the current language 
and “felt the present Minnesota provision would clearly be 
challenged.”73 The committee supported its concerns in the report.  
“Code provisions identical to the present Minnesota provision have 
been successfully challenged in three of four cases as 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.”74  The three cases cited as 
successfully challenging the present provision were American Civil 
Liberties Union, Inc. v. The Florida Bar,75 J.C.J.D v. R.J.C.R.,76 and 
Beshear v. Butt77 with the unsuccessful challenge coming in Stretton v. 
Disciplinary Board Of Supreme Court Of Pennsylvania.78  The committee 
noted that in Stretton, the court “was forced to adopt a narrow 
construction”79 of the provision and that in another case, Buckley v. 
Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,80 in which the narrow construction was 
“expressly stated in the code,” the provision was “struck down as 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.”81  The committee also 
documented the fact that the 1990 ABA provision had already 
survived a constitutional challenge.82 
Concerning a candidate’s ability to attend political gatherings, 
the advisory committee did not follow the 1990 ABA Model Code 
language allowing judges or candidates subject to public election to 
 
 72. Id. at 2. 
 73. Id. at 5 n.6. 
 74. Id. 
 75. American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. The Florida Bar, 744 F.Supp. 1094, 
1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990). 
 76. J.C.J.D v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 953 (Ky. 1991). 
 77. Beshear v. Butt, 773 F.Supp. 1229, 1229 (E.D. Ark. 1991) rev’d on 
procedural grounds, No. 91-3426EA, 1992 WL 119188, at *2 (8th Cir. June 4, 1992). 
 78. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. Of S. Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 137 (3rd Cir. 
1991). 
 79. Id.  The construction adopted in Stretton was that the canon’s use of 
“announcing one’s views” was limited to “situations in which the candidate’s 
speech pertains to matters that may come before the court for resolution.”  Id. at 
143.  The court reasoned that the state judicial board had previously adopted the 
“narrow construction” position in prior litigation, a narrow construction was 
consistent with other provisions of the Judicial Code, and the practice that “every 
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality,” was proper.  Therefore, the court was “persuaded that the 
broad interpretation of [the canon] urged upon us by plaintiff would be rejected 
by the state Supreme Court and that it would adopt the construction advanced by 
the Boards here.”  Id. at 143-44. 
 80. Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 224 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 81. Advisory Committee, supra note 73. 
 82. Id.  The case cited was Ackerson v. Kentucky Jud. Ret. & Removal Com’n, 776 
F.Supp. 309, 309 (W.D. Ky. 1991). 
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attend political gatherings and identify themselves as members of 
political parties, instead adding to their proposed Canon 5(C) only 
those parts of the 1990 Code allowing such candidates to speak to 
gatherings on their own behalf, appear in media advertisements to 
support their candidacy, and distribute promotional campaign 
literature.83 
On February 8, 1995, the Minnesota Supreme Court ordered a 
hearing, set for April 12, 1995, to consider the advisory committee’s 
recommendations from its final report.84  The order allowed those 
desiring to submit written statements or make oral presentations to 
do so.85 
In response to the court order, Honorable Thomas R. Butler, 
Chair of the Advisory Committee, submitted a written report 
concerning the committee’s recommendations.86  In this report, 
Judge Butler outlined the following reasons for siding with the 
ABA’s language.  First, the constitutionality of the present language 
was suspect while the proposed language had already been 
construed to be constitutional.  Second, disciplinary proceedings 
would be uncommon because a candidate would, according to the 
commentary to Canon 5(A)(3), “emphasize in any public statement 
the candidate’s duty to uphold the law regardless of his or her 
personal views.”87  Third, the ABA version attempted to “strike the 
balance” between the difficulty of prosecution and the need of the 
voters to know more about their candidates.  Fourth, any statement 
that would violate the existing rule would not necessarily be dealt 
with before election day.88  Fifth, in two prior Minnesota cases 
involving lawyer candidates violating the existing rule, the lawyers’ 
 
 83. Advisory Committee, supra note 71 at app. Code of Judicial Conduct 
Comparison, at 44. 
 84. Order for Hearing to Consider Proposed Amendments to the Code of 
Judicial Conduct and the Rules of the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards 
1995. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Letter from Hon. Thomas R. Butler, Chair, Advisory Committee to Review 
the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of 
the Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk of the 
Appellate Courts, (April 4, 1995) (on file with the Clerk of Appellate Courts, 
Minnesota Judicial Center) [hereinafter “Butler Letter”]. 
 87. Advisory Committee, supra note 71 at app. Code of Judicial Conduct 
Comparison, at 42. 
 88. For example, any announcement or statement made immediately before 
the general election could “turn the tide of the election and no disciplinary 
proceeding could even be commenced before election day has passed.”  Butler 
Letter, supra note 86, at 11. 
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disciplinary board took no action against the candidate.  Sixth, 
neither the lawyers’ board nor judges’ board had the economic 
resources to defend the existing language.89 
Among the other submissions filed was a letter on behalf of 
the Minnesota District Judges Association, who “voted to support 
the adoption of the recommendations of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court Advisory Committee, except for  . . . proposed Canon 
5(A)(3)(d).”90  The Minnesota Conference of Chief Judges 
“endorsed the recommendations in the report with one exception” 
which was the proposed Canon 5(A)(3)(d).91  Similarly, the Court 
Rules and Administration Committee of the Minnesota State Bar 
Association reviewed the report and at their midyear meetings in 
January 1995, the MSBA’s Board of Governors and House of 
Delegates voted to support all amendments proposed except 
Canon 5(A)(3)(d).92  In that oral report, The MSBA did recognize 
the Advisory Committee’s arguments concerning constitutional 
issues and prior case law, but sided with the District Judges 
Association and the Conference of Chief Judges in recommending 
that the supreme court adopt all proposed amendments except 
that of Canon 5(A)(3)(d), of which a recommendation was made 
that “additional study be undertaken concerning the possible 
effects of changing the political speech provisions . . . before such a 
change is made.”93 
While judges generally were averse to Canon 5(A)(3)(d), at 
least one lawyer urged the adoption by the court of Canon 5.  
Attorney Lauren Maker stressed “the side effect of chilling all free 
speech rights” of the existing Canon 7.94  She further emphasized 
that 
[t]he press gives little or no coverage to these races, 
 
 89. Butler Letter, supra note 86, at 10-12. 
 90. Letter from Elizabeth Hayden, President, Minnesota District Judges 
Association, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk of the Appellate Courts, (April 6, 1995) 
(on file with the Clerk of Appellate Courts, Minnesota Judicial Center). 
 91. Letter from Kevin S. Burke, Chair, Conference of Chief Judges, to 
Frederick Grittner, Clerk of the Appellate Courts, (March 17, 1995) (on file with 
the Clerk of Appellate Courts, Minnesota Judicial Center). 
 92. Letter from Candice M. Hojan, Court Rules and Administration 
Committee, MSBA, to Office of Appellate Courts, (March 31, 1995) (on file with 
the Clerk of Appellate Courts, Minnesota Judicial Center). 
 93. Id. at 3. 
 94. Letter from Lauren K. Maker, Attorney, to the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota, (April 7, 1995) (on file with the Clerk of Appellate Courts, Minnesota 
Judicial Center). 
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because, as one reporter told me, all the candidates can 
say is that they are qualified and they will be fair.  Even the 
League of Women Voters was hesitant to hold a 
candidates’ forum for judicial races, because it was 
perceived that Canon 7 prevented them from asking 
about any issues of substance from the candidates . . . .  
The cornerstone to a true democracy is the free exercise 
of universal franchise by an educated and informed 
electorate.95 
On November 1, 1995, the supreme court ordered the 
promulgation of the amendments to the Minnesota Code of 
Judicial Conduct, effective January 1, 1996.96  The committee’s 
proposed Canon 5(A)(3)(d) was not adopted. 
In September 1997 the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards 
petitioned the supreme court to “clarify the nonpartisan nature of 
judicial elections.”97  The supreme court ordered hearings 
concerning the Greg Wersal issue, which centered primarily on 
endorsements and what constituted a political party.98  The court 
adopted these recommendations, effective January 1, 1998.99 
IV. THE DECISION 
The Eighth Circuit Court wisely chose strict scrutiny as the 
standard of review after much contemplation, but it was not a black 
and white decision.  The reasons the court used the highest 
 
 95. Id. at 1-2. 
 96. Order of Minnesota Supreme Court, Promulgation of Amendments to 
the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct and Rules of Board on Judicial Standards 
(Nov. 1, 1995)(No. C4-85-697). 
 97. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Order of the Minnesota Supreme Court Amending Canon 5 of the Code 
of Judicial Conduct, (Dec. 23, 1997) No. C7-81-300.  Comparing the 1998 and 
1996 versions of the Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5(A)(1)(a) in both states 
that judges or candidates shall not “act as a leader or hold any office in a political 
organization;” with the 1998 version adding, “identify themselves as members of a 
political organization, except as necessary to vote in an election.”  MINNESOTA 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(a) (1998); Canon 5(A)(1)(d) in both 
states that judges or candidates shall not “attend political gatherings;” with the 
1998 version adding, “or seek, accept or use endorsements from a political 
organization.”  MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (1998).  
Similarly, Canon 5(B)(1)(a) in the 1996 version declared that a judge or 
candidate may unless prohibited by law “speak to gatherings on his or her own 
behalf.”  The present language adopted in 1998 clarifies this as “speak to 
gatherings, other than political organization gatherings, on his or her own behalf.”  
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(1)(a) (1998). 
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possible level of review are crucial and must be remembered 
throughout the evaluation of the case. 
The standard of review in First Amendment cases is not 
necessarily strict scrutiny, and the court explained that early.100  The 
court pointed out that while prior cases showed, for example, that 
other courts had reviewed contribution limits for non-judicial office 
under a lesser standard than strict scrutiny,101 the political speech of 
candidates for judicial office is different than that of candidates for 
legislative or executive office.102  The court stated that in the 
executive and legislative areas, “the public has a right to know the 
details of the programs that candidates propose to enact into law 
and administer.”103  However, the “neutral, decision making nature 
of the judicial function” separates judges and other governmental 
officials and “[t]he judicial candidate simply does not have a First 
Amendment right to promise to abuse his office.”104  From the 
State’s perspective, “restrictions on Minnesota judicial candidates’ 
speech are entirely different from limitations on the speech of 
candidates for partisan office.”105 
The court then examined United States Civil Service Commission 
v. National Association of Letter Carriers,106 in which the Hatch Act, 
prohibiting federal employees from actively participating in 
political campaigns, was challenged.107  There, because the 
restrictions imposed did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, 
the court used a balancing test less rigorous than strict scrutiny.108  
Naturally, the defendants in Kelly suggested that lesser standard of 
review was appropriate here.109  However, the court, even though 
stating that the balancing test of Letter Carriers would apply to 
Wersal as a potential government employee, recognized that Canon 
 
 100. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 862 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)) 
(“[r]egulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs’ rights must be narrowly 
tailored and advance a compelling state interest. Lesser burdens, however, trigger 
less exacting review . . .”). 
 101. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-89 (2000). 
 102. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 862. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 863. 
 106. 413 U.S. 548 (1973). 
 107. Id. at 550. 
 108. Id. at 564. 
 109. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 864. 
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5 restrained election activity of the candidates themselves.110  It 
then stated, “[t]he burden on the plaintiff in either case may be 
comparable, but the public’s interest in free speech is greater 
where the person subject to restrictions is a candidate for public 
office, about whom the public is obliged to inform itself.”111  For that 
reason, the court invoked strict scrutiny.112 
Thus, the court applied a critical generality to the overall 
picture of this case even before deciding its merits.  While the court 
seemed to begin its “review” analysis suggesting that the distinction 
between the public’s right to know about legislative and judicial 
candidates was important enough to require differing standards 
with respect to the people’s freedom of speech, that very right of 
the public was the deciding factor to applying strict scrutiny when 
the free speech restriction was imposed on candidates for public 
office.113 
As with all strict scrutiny decisions involving the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the State must first establish 
that it has a “compelling reason” for the regulation imposed and 
that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.114 
In terms of the compelling interest of the State of Minnesota, 
the court expressed the importance of the independence of the 
judiciary and declared, “[t]here is simply no question but that a 
judge’s ability to apply the law neutrally is a compelling 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  Indeed, strict scrutiny is recognized as the proper standard of review 
in the literature. 
Rules that place direct limits on what candidates may say or do in their 
campaigns, such as those that commonly appear in codes of judicial 
ethics, have been subjected to special scrutiny.  In order to justify these 
restrictions, courts have often required that the state demonstrate a 
“compelling state interest” in its regulation, and that the regulations be 
tailored narrowly to the purposes they seek to accomplish. 
MCFADDEN, supra note 44 at 70. 
 113. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 864. 
 114. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 141-142 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  “The First Amendment surely requires that the restriction be 
demonstrably supported by not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling 
one, and that the restriction operates without unnecessarily circumscribing 
protected expression.”  Id. (stating that the two facets to the analysis of a First 
Amendment infringement case implicating a restriction on political speech).  The 
test has also been described, as it is in this case, as the State having to “show that 
the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”  Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 
(1992). 
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governmental interest of the highest order.”115  The question is, 
what is truly meant by the term “independent?”  It appears there 
are two possibilities that require further exploration.  Either 
independence means literally free from all external (and 
consequently personal internal) influences, or it means free from 
the appearance of dependence on those influences. 
If the former, does the State genuinely have an interest in 
completely independent judges, that is, judges who decide cases 
with no preconceived notions, no preformed thoughts, no 
subjective ideas or personal principles from which to draw?  Are 
they to decide cases within a moral vacuum?  Being impartial is 
uncontroversial in the context of freedom from personal bias for or 
against litigants in that judge’s court, but becomes controversial if 
judges are required to “avoid the influence of their own moral, 
social or political views in their decision making.”116  The court, 
quoting Stretton, further stated that 
[i]n those [executive and legislative] areas, the public has 
the right to know the details of the programs that 
candidates propose to enact into law and administer.  
Pledges to follow certain paths are not only expected, but 
are desirable so that voters may make a choice between 
proposed agendas that affect the public.  By contrast, the 
judicial system is based on the concept of individualized 
decisions on challenged conduct and interpretations of 
law enacted by the other branches of government.117 
The fact of the matter is that interpretation of law naturally has 
to include one’s own viewpoint, regardless of the historical record 
or documentation available.  If the plain language of the law is 
clear, no judicial determination is needed.  The problem is that the 
more complex the issue, the more convoluted the particular law, 
the more nebulous the supporting documentation, then the more 
necessary it is that a judge will use his or her inherent value system.  
Voters need to be fully aware of this vital concept so that they can 
accurately and soundly “make a choice between proposed agendas 
that affect the public.”118  In fact, the increasing concern of what 
many refer to as judicial activism makes it imperative that voters 
know a judge’s value system.119 
 
 115. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 864. 
 116. MCFADDEN, supra note 44, at 71. 
 117. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 862. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Judicial activism is the “philosophy . . . whereby judges allow their 
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The court further declared that even though the methods of 
judicial selection among the states and of the federal system are 
varied, the “explicit or implicit” goal in either is to maintain “an 
independent judiciary as free from political, economic and social 
pressure as possible so judges can decide cases without those 
influences.”120  Of course, even though the federal system of 
appointment is different than Minnesota’s electoral system, no one 
can doubt the importance to many Americans of the political 
affiliation of the President of the United States when a Supreme 
Court vacancy arises.121  “Those who claim switching to an 
appointed judicial system would remove politics from the courts 
are naïve . . . .  In reality . . . there may be only a handful of judges 
who earned their appointments based solely on merit and not on 
partisanship.”122 
In recent years, the selection of Supreme Court justices has 
been a most heated and political battle.  Concerning the conflict 
with Supreme Court nominee Robert H. Bork, “[u]nlike the Fortas, 
Haynsworth, and Carsell cases, where much of the Senate debate 
focused on non-ideological considerations such as ethics and 
competence, the deliberations on Bork centered on the nominee’s 
ideology.”123  Will current and future federal appointment battles 
 
personal views about public policy . . . to guide their decisions, usually with the 
suggestion that adherents . . . are willing to ignore precedent.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 850 (7th ed. 1999).  Of course, judicial activism can work both a 
conservative and liberal bias, whether the subject is abortion rights or child 
visitation.  See Thomas L. Jipping, If Judicial Activism Is the Means, the End Is Not 
Justified, (June 19, 2000), at 
http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0600judicialactivism.htm; see 
also LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA, CHOOSING MINNESOTA’S JUDGES: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM AND ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS 11 (1998) 
[hereinafter “LEAGUE”] (“If judges are perceived to be ideological activists who 
make policy, rather than independent and dispassionate appliers of the law, then 
it follows that judges should not be insulated from politics, but that they should be 
publicly accountable for their rulings.”). 
 120. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 865. 
 121. William E. Hulbary & Thomas G. Walker, The Supreme Court Selection 
Process: Presidential Motivations and Judicial Performance, 33 W. POL. Q. 185, 189 
(1980).  In an examination of presidential motivations in judicial selection, 
William Hulbary and Thomas Walker concluded that approximately 93 percent of 
the eighty-four Supreme Court justices studied “reached the Court in part because 
the Chief Executive desired a nominee of a particular philosophical bent.” 
 122. BOUTROS, supra note 43, at 40. 
 123. JOHN MASSARO, SUPREMELY POLITICAL 159 (1990).  In what amounts to an 
undeniable truth, WASHINGTON POST columnist David Broder wrote, concerning 
the Bork nomination, “[i]t should offend no one that the battle has this intensely 
political coloration.  The pope’s visit reminds us that even those who have a higher 
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be fought so that in the end each side is content with the fact that a 
completely neutral federal judge has been chosen?  Of course not.  
Each side’s goal is to select a judge who, though fair and impartial, 
has an underlying value system that more or less represents that 
side’s views and will be used to interpret existing laws. 
Maybe the state’s interest is only in the perception of 
independence from the public’s point of view, regardless of an 
individual judge’s true posture?  But not being able to express 
one’s views does not imply those views don’t exist.  “You have not 
converted a man because you have silenced him.”124  Judges and 
judicial candidates aren’t nonpartisan simply because they can’t 
talk politics, but that is not always seen as the case.125  Akin to the 
“Guns Don’t Kill People, People Kill People” mantra, words don’t 
make a partisan judge, a partisan judge makes a partisan judge.  
The bottom line is that a false appearance with no underlying truth 
can only harm the judiciary and the voters. 
In reality, it appears the majority opinion concurred with both 
ideas.  Quoting Letter Carriers, “it is not only important that the 
Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political 
justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be 
avoiding it.”126  Additionally, “[t]he state’s interest in ensuring that 
judges be and appear to be neither antagonistic nor beholden to any 
interest, party, or person is entitled to the greatest respect.”127 
But as discussed, given human nature, the idea of a sterile 
 
calling are chosen through a political mechanism.”  Id. at 168 (citing David 
Broder, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1987, at D7).  Further, Terri Jennings Peretti, 
Professor of Political Science at Santa Clara University, argues in her book, IN 
DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT, that 
[p]olicy motivation, particularly in the form of value-voting serves as the 
primary vehicle by which the [Supreme] Court performs an important 
representation function.  Representation occurs when the justices decide 
in accordance with their political views, which have been consciously and 
deliberately sanctioned by elected officials competing for political 
control of the Court through the selection process.  Rather than acting 
arbitrarily, the justices are merely carrying out the “policy premises” of 
their appointments. 
TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 84 (1999). 
 124. JOHN MORLEY, ON COMPROMISE ch. 5 (1874). 
 125. For example, one writer remarks, “While there is no reason unnecessarily 
to stifle interesting discussion in the context of judicial elections, the law must not 
allow speech that compromises the impartiality of the candidate.”  Neil K. Sethi, 
The Elusive Middle Ground: A Proposed Constitutional Speech Restriction for Judicial 
Selection, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 728 (1997). 
 126. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 867. 
 127. Id. at 865 (emphasis added). 
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judicial world is impossible.  To be completely nonpolitical is to be 
without thought and devoid of values.  The fallacy of the current 
system is that voters are not clamoring for “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
treatment from their judiciary or the State.  The choice by the 
people to hold judicial elections, even nonpartisan ones, is the 
same choice to bring to the table candidates of varying viewpoints.  
And yes, some of those viewpoints may be political.  “Where the 
people are to rule through elections, such elections must respect 
the power of the people, not fear of popular incompetence or 
special interests.”128  It is and can never be bad to know what the 
person you vote for might do in any given situation, because it 
provides direct accountability to the voter.  Why have an election absent 
this accountability? 
The dissent captured this sentiment in its view of what the 
people of Minnesota historically adopted as their policy on the 
judiciary.  In Moon v. Halverson,129 a Minnesota case from 1939, the 
issue surrounded 1912 election law legislation that placed, among 
other candidates, all supreme court justice and elective county 
officer names on a nonpartisan ballot.130  The statute further 
disallowed party designations on the ballot and no candidate filing 
for nomination on the ballot could state his party affiliation, a 
move to increase the selection of judges based on merit.131  
Halverson allegedly let it be known in public he was basically a 
Farmer-Labor candidate.132  The Moon court stated that two 
constructions of the statute were available; either a candidate could 
not state his party affiliation at any time throughout the election 
process, or the statute merely referenced filing for nomination and 
 
 128. Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union at 4-5, 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4021) 
[hereinafter “MCLU Brief”].  Further, 
[s]ince then, Minnesota voters have had the opportunity several times to 
adopt the “conservative,” “holding back waves of popular excitement” 
Hamiltonian approach to judicial selection.  Minnesota voters have not 
chosen to make the change and adopt the federal system.  They have left 
the people with an important voice in the selection of judges. 
Id. at 10. 
 129. Moon v. Halverson, 206 Minn. 331, 288 N.W. 579 (1939). 
 130. Id. at 580. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  In 1944, the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party merged with the 
Minnesota Democratic Party to form the present DFL.  Historical information 
about the Farmer-Labor Party, available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/articlesnew/04374.html. 
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ballot content.133  “We think the latter more practical and 
reasonable in light of our elective system of government.”134  
Further, “[t]he statute does not prohibit party activity or 
endorsements.”135  Clearly, the court could have made the case for 
an extension of this limitation to further political activity as a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute.  Noteworthy is not only the 
Moon court’s inferred reaffirmation of the importance of 
information to the electorate and the ability of a candidate to allow 
political information to reach the voters, but the fact that the 
court’s initial decision, as stated, was in truth a value judgment. 
The dissent further emphasized the history of Minnesota 
policy towards its judiciary and if, in fact, independent judicial 
elections are within that policy interest.  “Minnesota has repeatedly 
affirmed its citizens’ right to elect their judges, and has bolstered 
that franchise with laws enhancing merit-based elections and 
furthering the flow of information regarding the candidates to the 
electorate.”136  It is this flow of information which allows citizens to 
elect judges based on their merits, which include not only 
“character, fitness, integrity, background (with the exception of 
their political affiliation), education, legal experience, work habits 
and abilities,” but other qualities as well, qualities that “piqued the 
interest” of Minnesota’s founders as well as those wishing to be fully 
informed about a candidate before sending him or her to the 
bench to interpret the law.137  Indeed the dissent astutely read the 
context of an independent judiciary to take into account not 
merely the right of the candidate to inform, but the criticality of 
the people to be informed when selecting justices to serve.  This 
entitlement of information to the citizenry is a sentiment that is not 
only inherent in the dissent’s opinion, but also, as discussed, was 
vital to the majority opinion in its decision to apply strict scrutiny as 
the standard of review. 
The idea is this: An independent judiciary means judges who 
are “elected by well-informed, independent voters.”138  In effect, any 
policy that stifles the free flow of information undermines the 
 
 133. Moon, 206 Minn. at 333, 288 N.W. at 581. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  It is also interesting and insightful that the Moon court in this instance 
regarded emphasis on the candidate’s merits “irrespective of his party 
membership or association” as a “Utopia.”  Id. at 580. 
 136. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 890. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at n.30. 
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judicial selection process.139  Where this will come into play may not 
necessarily be with Minnesota’s interest in having an independent 
judiciary, which may indeed be compelling, but with the scope of 
what Minnesota has done with this decision.  To have an 
independent judiciary, the voters need to be fully informed so, 
rather than electing partisan judges that they don’t know are 
partisan, they can elect independent candidates.  The decision 
becomes a two way street.  Is it more important to keep information 
from voters about a candidate’s views on disputed legal or political 
issues in order to minimize the chance that a partisan judge will be 
elected based on a populist appeal?  Or is it just as important that 
voters know about a candidate’s views on these issues so that a 
partisan judge is not elected?  The whole concept of an election is 
voter choice, and voter choice equates with voter information.  The 
State of Minnesota has already chosen to give its citizens decision-
making power and has accepted the risk that “the people may be 
swayed one way or another by appeals and artifices of political 
campaigning.”140 
Indeed, the dissent pointed out from Eu v. San Francisco County 
Democratic Central Committee141 that “[a] State’s claim that it is 
enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by 
restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with 
some skepticism.”142  While the facts of Eu involved legislative 
positions, the fundamental truth of that proclamation holds for any 
process where the people make an elective choice. 
Another area of dispute in this case was that of judicial 
political pressure.  “[A] State has an interest in protecting its judges 
from pressure to participate in partisan activities . . . .”143  In the 
present case it certainly cannot be that the State is concerned that 
any judge would truly be beholden to the values or platform of a 
political party.  If that were true, the public would be putting a 
much higher demand on its judiciary than on its elected legislative 
officials, from which expectations in this regard have not 
traditionally been high.  It is not shocking that elected officials 
have and will continue to break campaign promises, only to be 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. MCLU Brief, supra note 128, at 11. 
 141. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 214 
(1989). 
 142. Id. at 228. 
 143. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 867. 
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reelected again.  But more importantly in the context of judicial 
candidates, could it be reasonably perceived that announcing one’s 
views on disputed legal or political issues is akin to a campaign 
promise?  If Minnesota’s goal is to keep the judiciary independent 
from political influences in the sense that, even if an individual 
judge leans toward one political philosophy more than another, the 
State wants that judge to be able to “cross over” without feeling any 
political ramifications, the importance of the electorate to know 
from what side the judge leans is still too important to keep hidden 
from the people. 
The majority opinion continued to pursue the idea that judges 
will bind themselves to particular positions and decide cases in a 
particular manner solely because the judge has announced his or 
her view.  “The judicial candidate simply does not have a First 
Amendment right to promise to abuse his office.”144  As the dissent 
stressed, this proves too much, and not only because the Supreme 
Court has said, “the State may ban such illegal agreements [to 
engage in illegal conduct] without trenching on any right of 
association protected by the First Amendment,” and that “[t]he fact 
such an agreement takes the form of words does not confer upon 
it . . . the constitutional immunities that the First Amendment 
extends to speech.”145  The majority opinion seemed to convey the 
feeling with those “abuse” words that the announce clause of 
Canon 5 is the only thing standing between judicial independence 
and substantial impropriety.  But a judge has no further right to 
abuse his office just because he has leaped the election hurdle.  
Canon 2 of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct is entitled A 
Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of 
the Judge’s Activities, within which Canon 2(B) states, “A judge shall 
not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence 
judicial conduct or judgment.”146  Moreover, Canon 3(A)(2) 
declares, “[the judge] shall be unswayed by partisan interests, 
public clamor or fear of criticism.”147  Of course, the legislature has 
also created and given the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards 
the power to “censure or remove a judge for . . . conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial 
 
 144. Id. at 862. 
 145. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982). 
 146. MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(B) (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
 147. MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(2) (2000). 
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office into disrepute.”148 
Similarly, in its analysis of whether Canon 5 was “necessary,” 
the court confused the idea of announcing one’s views on disputed 
legal or political issues with making “particularized pledges and 
predetermined commitments that mark campaigns for legislative 
and executive office.”149  That comparison is mere fallacy.  The 
contention is that a candidate’s message will attract a certain 
number of voters for the wrong reasons.  However, the flip side of 
this assertion is equally plausible, that a judicial candidate’s stance 
will not always curry positive favor with the voters.  Ideally, voters 
vote for or against incumbents based on a careful study of their past 
decisions and for challengers based on their views of disputed legal 
or political issues, in the context of a judicial philosophy.150  
Certainly, a candidate’s views of the legal and political issues will 
turn off a substantial number of voters, and in all likelihood the net 
benefit will be zero to the candidate.  The voters as a whole, 
however, will have taken a major victory in terms of candidate 
information. 
The vast majority of voters are not looking for commitments, 
they are looking for views.  In the case at bar, Mr. Wersal, at 
multiple Republican Party gatherings, said he favored “strict 
construction of the Constitution.”151  Strict constructionism is 
“[t]he doctrinal view . . . holding that judges should interpret a 
document or statute . . . according to its literal terms, without 
looking to other sources to ascertain the meaning.”152  A disputed 
legal issue?  Of course.  Moreover, a candidate who promotes the 
fact he or she is a strict constructionist does no more than advocate 
a position undoubtedly held by a fair number of practicing judges.  
Certainly a position Minnesota voters would like to know as they 
cast their ballots.  In the case of strict constructionism, it would be 
impossible to prejudge a case because strict constructionism is a 
method of interpretation, not final adjudication.  Have all strict 
 
 148. MINN. STAT. § 490.16 (2000). 
 149. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 877. 
 150. The majority opinion states, “We further believe the Minnesota Supreme 
Court would conclude that general discussions of case law or a candidate’s judicial 
philosophy do not fall within the scope of the announce clause.”  Kelly, 247 F.3d at 
882.  The court says this, however, in the context of Stretton and the district court’s 
“issues that would likely come before them.”  As Judge Posner points out in 
Buckley, what issue is likely not to come before the court?  Buckley v. Illinois 
Judicial Inquiry Board, 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 151. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 858. 
 152. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (7th ed. 1999). 
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constructionists currently on the bench prejudged their cases?  A 
well informed public can only be appreciative of the fact a judge 
will decide different cases with different facts based on a core set of 
values.  That is exactly what the electorate is looking for. 
The majority opinion looked at recent Minnesota cases for 
additional support during its “necessary” analysis.  In Peterson v. 
Stafford,153 the court stated that the judicial office “requires its 
holder studiously to avoid partisan politics, refrain from all 
discussions of public issues and restrict one’s membership and 
participation in organizations to those primarily of a professional 
nature.”154  This too goes far beyond reasonable expectations.  Just 
as announcing one’s views on disputed issues will not necessarily 
lead to abuse of power, announcing one’s views also does not lead 
to partisan loyalty to an entire platform.  In fact, what does an 
“independent” voter proclaim of him- or herself?  Not that he or 
she has no views on any issues, but that he or she is not necessarily 
loyal to the views of one party.  If the concern is attendance at 
political gatherings, many registered party members likewise do not 
fall in step with their party on every issue. 
Former Governor Arne Carlson, during the supreme court’s 
consideration and approval process of the amendments to Canon 
5, said, “[f]or the public to read newspaper headlines that a 
political party has endorsed and will work to elect a particular 
candidate would greatly harm the public’s confidence in the 
independence of the judiciary.”155  But isn’t there greater harm in 
the candidate in fact harboring partisan feelings of which the voter 
knows and can know nothing?  If a particular partisan candidate 
wanted to deceptively “play” independent as an election strategy, 
he could hide behind Canon 5, citing it as the reason he “can’t 
answer that question.” 
Further evidence of what is really a disrespect for the voter’s 
right to know can be found in Gustafson v. Holm,156 a case the 
Stretton court cited and from which reasoning was borrowed and 
repeated in the present case.  In Gustafson, the relevant issue was 
the use of the word “incumbent” on the ballot.157 
Use of the word ‘incumbent’ following the candidate’s 
 
 153. Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418, 425 (1992). 
 154. Id. at 425. 
 155. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 870. 
 156. 232 Minn. 118, 44 N.W.2d 443 (1950). 
 157. Id. 232 Minn. at 126-127, 44 N.W.2d at 447. 
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name simply informs the voter of the person who 
presently holds the position.  In assisting voters to cast 
their votes intelligently for offices unfamiliar to the 
average voter, it is only a matter of fairness that he be 
advised who the present judge is.  If he then believes that 
the judge should be retained, he has the opportunity of 
expressing his opinion by his vote.  If he feels that the 
present judge should be replaced, he has a like 
opportunity of so indicating his opinion.  The underlying 
purpose of the legislation is to identify the candidate so 
that the voter will know whom he is voting for.158 
Two issues are notable here.  First, evidently the voter is to feel (or 
be?) fully informed and encouraged to cast a vote, regardless of his 
or her knowledge of the candidate, solely on the candidate’s 
incumbent status.  Second, the label “incumbent” is apparently a 
satisfactory tag to identify a judicial candidate, but party affiliation 
must not enter the voter’s thought process.  How is it any better to 
vote straight “incumbent” rather than straight Republican when the 
stated purpose of the legislation requiring this is to inform the 
voter?  Granted, in 1950 the Minnesota District Judges Association 
had adopted the American Bar Association’s 1924 Canons of 
Judicial Ethics, but as discussed, the bar on political speech and 
announcing one’s views was relatively low.  At least voters have a 
“gut feeling” based on party affiliation; incumbent status by itself is 
empty of relevant information. 
Throughout this analysis, the court relied heavily on and 
borrowed much reasoning from Stretton, in which the announce 
clause was challenged.159  In Stretton, the plaintiff was a lawyer and 
candidate for the Court of Common Pleas in Chester County, 
Pennsylvania, who brought suit contending the announce clause 
impeded his ability to campaign.160  The announce clause was given 
a narrow construction and “limited to situations in which the 
candidate’s speech pertains to matters that may come before the 
court for resolution,”161 which narrowly tailored the provision to 
serve Pennsylvania’s compelling interest in an impartial judiciary.162  
In Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, a mid-court judge was 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 139. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 143. 
 162. Id. at 144. 
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running for a seat on the Supreme Court of Illinois.163  During his 
campaign, the judge circulated campaign literature stating he had 
“never written an opinion reversing a rape conviction.”164  Two 
weeks from the election, the Judicial Inquiry Board filed charges 
against him.165  Judge Posner, in his analysis of the announce 
clause, stated, “the only safe response to [the rule] is silence.”166  
Further, “when an overinclusive rule has the effect . . . of greatly 
curtailing an important part of the speech ‘market,’ the rule is 
deeply problematic.”167  In response to the district judge’s 
narrowing of the rule to confine it to “issues likely to come before 
the judge in his judicial capacity,” Judge Posner said, “[t]here is 
almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before a 
judge of an American court, state or federal, of general 
jurisdiction.”168  More to the point, the broad construction of the 
announce clause has been found unconstitutional every single time 
it has been challenged.  Even when narrowed, it has not passed 
muster.169 
The compelling interest put forth by the majority is laudable 
and the independence of the judiciary is of extreme importance.  
But the stakes are higher when the subject is the heart of our 
democratic process: election speech and association.  And this bar 
remains that high even though the subject is a judicial, not 
legislative or executive, candidate.  Evidence of the cap on the 
judiciary’s independence from the First Amendment is given in the 
dissent’s citation to Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia.170 
Neither the Commonwealth’s interest in protecting the 
reputation of its judges, nor its interest in maintaining the 
institutional integrity of its courts is sufficient to justify the 
subsequent punishment of speech at issue here . . . .  The 
remaining interest sought to be protected, the institutional 
reputation of the courts, is entitled to no greater weight in the 
constitutional scales.171 
The dissent further pointed out that while the basis for sanctions 
 
 163. Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 225 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 164. Id. at 226. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 228. 
 167. Id. at 229. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 231. 
 170. 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
 171. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 898 (Beam, J. dissenting) (quoting Landmark 
Communications, 435 U.S. at 839, 841-42). 
36
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/3
09_NELSON 4/22/2002  10:24 AM 
2002] DON’T ROCK THE BOAT: MINNESOTA’S CANON 5 1643 
may be different between Landmark and the case at bar, the severity 
of the Canon 5 restrictions to a judicial candidate “pose a much 
greater danger.”172 
In terms of attendance at political gatherings, the inability of 
Minnesota judicial candidates to attend political gatherings is in 
even starker contrast to most states that have public judicial 
elections.173  The necessity of a prohibition that as its purpose is to 
curtail a look of impropriety suffers from the same fundamental 
problem as the announce clause.  That is, attendance at an event 
certainly does not guarantee or even predict that a candidate will 
blindly follow the tenets of that party, something brought up by the 
dissent.174  But more importantly, if the goal is to disallow all 
attendance at truly “political gatherings,” the provision allows 
attendance at gatherings that can be far more political than 
Republican or Democrat.175  One of the most important points the 
dissent made about this is that while varied ideas abound at both 
Republican and Democratic functions because of the “big-tent” 
nature of those parties, single issue organizations have obviously a 
small focus that may be counted on by that organization’s members 
to be upheld by the candidate should he or she get elected.176 
Further, since a candidate is running for election, he or she 
needs votes.  Attendance, not necessarily even speech, at a political 
party gathering is just another way to get in touch with more voters.  
“Candidates speak at political gatherings about their work 
experience, family life, community activities, family history and 
other facts about their lives which indicate what kind of person they 
are.”177  A particular example is that of former judicial candidate 
Bruce A. Peterson, who spoke to the Republican Party of Minnesota 
 
 172. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 898 n.40. 
 173. See generally, supra note 67. 
 174. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 900 (Beam, J. dissenting). 
 175. It is noteworthy that the actual language used in Canon 5(A)(1)(d) is 
“shall not . . . attend political gatherings” while the language regarding holding 
office in, identifying oneself as a member of, making speeches on behalf of and 
other clauses of Canon 5 refer to “political organizations.”  It is the term “political 
organization” of Canon 5(D) that is defined as a political party organization.  
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2000).  Therefore, it is possible 
that the term “political gathering” of Canon 5(A)(1)(d) could be construed as any 
gathering with a political message.  However, that is not the convention used in 
this case, and in fact, the dissent refers to Canon 5(A)(1)(d) as attending “political 
organization gatherings.”  Kelly, 247 F.3d at 900 (Beam, J. dissenting). 
 176. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 901 (Beam, J. dissenting). 
 177. Appellant’s Brief at 20, Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 
854 (8th Cir. 2001) No. 99-4021. 
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during the 1996 campaign, saying 
[d]uring the campaign . . . I spoke at an equal number of 
Republican and DFL gatherings . . . .  These meetings 
were some of the high points of the campaign.  The 
audiences were knowledgeable and interested, . . . the 
people present seemed likely to share their opinions with 
their friends and neighbors.  I never mentioned my party 
affiliation, nor did I ask for an endorsement.178 
Consequently, attendance at a smaller single focus group with 
proportionately fewer potential voters might suggest that particular 
candidate may be more in tune with that single issue.  However, 
consistency demands that even attendance at a minor single-issue 
political gathering does not mean that a candidate conforms to 
those views. 
The right to associate is “a right to join with others to pursue 
goals independently protected by the First Amendment.”179 
There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to 
associate with others for the common advancement of 
political beliefs and ideas is a form of  ‘orderly group 
activity’ protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments . . . .  The right to associate with the political 
party of one’s choice is an integral part of this basic 
constitutional freedom.180 
The danger here lies in the implied connection between the 
candidate and the “advancement of political beliefs,” presumably 
those of the candidate.  However, again, even though the right 
exists because the pursuit is protected, that does not mean that all 
individuals joined adhere fully to all beliefs of that organization. 
The thrust of Equal Protection is that similarly situated people 
must be treated similarly.  The majority opinion accurately stated 
that “[t]o conclude that the same restraints [of Canon 5] violate 
the Equal Protection Clause, we would have to determine that 
Canon 5 burdens the rights of political party members more than 
others and that ‘such differential treatment is not justified.’”181  To 
explore this, it is necessary to determine what rights other 
organizations would have that political parties lose because Canon 
5 forbids candidates to attend their political gatherings.  Simply 
 
 178. Id. (emphasis added). 
 179. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1013 (2nd ed. 1988). 
 180. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976). 
 181. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 875 (quoting California Med. Ass’n v. Federal Election 
Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 200 (1981)). 
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put, it centers on the right of the political organization to express 
itself as it chooses.182  The majority opinion cited Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, a case involving a restriction on partisan activities by 
government employees, as stating that legislatures must have some 
flexibility in determining which employment positions require 
restrictions on political activity and which do not.183  This footnoted 
citation within Broadrick referenced another case, McGowan v. 
Maryland184 as clearly supporting the proposition.  However, 
McGowan was a case involving the sale of merchandise on Sunday, a 
violation of Maryland statute, but more significantly it was an 
economic regulation, in which a rational basis standard of review, 
not strict scrutiny, was involved.  The court in the case at bar did 
not independently address the burdening of the rights of political 
party members in this regard. 
Further, such differential treatment is not justified.  The 
majority opinion, regarding political parties, stated, “[t]hose 
parties are simply in a better position than other organizations to 
hold a candidate in thrall.  Moreover, because political parties have 
comprehensive platforms, obligation to a party has a great 
likelihood of compromising a judge’s independence on a wide 
array of issues.”185  This is simply not true.  As alluded to above, the 
extensive scope of issues any political party holds as their own is the 
very thing decreasing the likelihood that a judge will be beholden 
to an entire party.  There are simply too many variations within the 
members of any one political party.  “A candidate’s appearance at a 
party function hardly indicates endorsement of its views.  A speech 
at a party function supports nothing beyond the candidate’s own 
words, and an endorsement suggests only that the endorser finds a 
candidate more palatable than any other presently available.”186  
The majority goes on to declare that Canon 4 imposes broad 
requirements that judges are to avoid involvement with associations 
(other than political parties) to avoid casting doubt on their 
impartiality.187  But the Canons as a whole impose those 
requirements on all judicial activities.  In other words, anything the 
Canons impose on a judge regarding associations in general could 
 
 182. Id. at 895 (Beam, J. dissenting). 
 183. Id. at 875 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 n. 5 (1973)). 
 184. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
 185. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 876. 
 186. Id. at 901 (Beam, J. dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 876. 
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be applied to his or her association with political parties as well, 
rendering unnecessary a distinct restriction concerning political 
parties. 
The dissent’s opinion regarding single-issue organizations was 
again on point.  As discussed, the risk that organizations that have a 
central issue focus will hold a candidate’s feet to the fire is far 
greater than if the organization is one of broad expanse.  As the 
dissent illustrated, these smaller groups are not necessarily distinct 
from the political or legal process.188  “This country is also seeing a 
marked increase in special interest politics, which brings out highly 
organized groups who are motivated to defeat or elect a judge 
according to his or her position (presumed known) on single issues 
such as abortion, term limits, the death penalty, or guns.”189  The 
majority comments that this dissenting argument is in fact a call for 
more, rather than less, restriction.190  But the obviousness of this 
problem on both ends suggests that the supreme court is not 
addressing the core of the problem.  “By removing the only 
organizations that endorse candidates across a spectrum of issues, 
voters are left with only the shrill voice of narrow advocacy coming 
from special interest groups.”191 
Admittedly, if the goal is to eliminate the appearance of 
judicial bias, from a narrowly tailored/necessary point of view, the 
underinclusive nature of the prohibition on attendance at political 
gatherings is likely not a constitutional problem and in fact 
underinclusiveness is rarely invalidated by the court.192  However, 
the compelling interest of the State must take a backseat to the 
fundamental rights that interest is curtailing.  The judicial 
candidate’s right of expression cannot be trumped solely because 
one of the three branches of government is deemed by the State to 
be “more equal” than the other two.  “In . . . inviting a candidate to 
speak, a party ‘reflects its members’ views about the philosophical 
and governmental matters that bind them together [and] seeks to 
 
 188. Id. at 901 (Beam, J. dissenting).  The dissenting opinion mentions groups 
active in recent judicial elections: The League of Women Voters, People for 
Responsible Government, Minnesota Women Lawyers, and Lavender Magazine, 
among others.  Id. 
 189. LEAGUE, supra note 119, at 10. (“These groups, whose interests are clearly 
focused, increasingly are targeting judicial campaigns as a relatively inexpensive 
way to influence public policy.”).  Id. 
 190. Id. at 872 n.17. 
 191. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 902 (Beam, J. dissenting). 
 192. TRIBE, supra note 179, at 1440 n.4. 
40
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/3
09_NELSON 4/22/2002  10:24 AM 
2002] DON’T ROCK THE BOAT: MINNESOTA’S CANON 5 1647 
convince others to join those members in a practical democratic 
task,’ an election.”193  The entire election process and all its players 
benefit by the free flow of information; candidates, parties, and 
voters. 
Much has been written about the judicial selection system, 
both locally and nationally.  The term “incumbent protection” has 
been thrown about, reflecting the apparent advantage incumbents 
have to reelection.194  For example, in the 2000 Minnesota General 
Election, all ten of the incumbent judges up for reelection won.195  
Reasons given for this advantage include lawyers who don’t want to 
run against sitting judges before whom they may be practicing and 
the listing of “incumbent” on ballots.196  Of course, the issue in the 
case at bar has some bearing as well.197 
The election system itself has come under question, in the 
form of the virtue of nonpartisan versus partisan elections.  
“[B]ecause the party voting cue is not available in nonpartisan 
elections, even more voters are relegated to basing their vote on 
irrelevant factors, such as ballot position and name.  Because of 
these factors, incumbents overwhelmingly win re-election, 
regardless of ability.”198  Some suggestions for improving the system 
include an active role for the media to inform voters.199  But in at 
least one large metro area of Minnesota, this will not likely result in 
an impartial, objective source of information for voters who 
indulge in print media.200  While there is nothing wrong with the 
 
 193. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 893 (Beam, J. dissenting) (quoting Colorado Republican 
Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 615 (1996)). 
 194. LEAGUE, supra note 119, at 10. 
 195. Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, 2000 – Minnesota General 
Election, Judicial Results (2000), at 
http://elections.sos.state.mn.us/ENR2000_General/ElecRslts.asp?M=J&P=A (last 
modified Dec. 12, 2000). 
 196. LEAGUE, supra note 119, at 10. 
 197. “With challengers unable to create traction by discussing actual issues . . . 
the results in judicial elections are hardly surprising.”  Kelly, 247 F.3d at 896 
(Beam, J. dissenting). 
 198. Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One ‘Best’ 
Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 26 (1995). 
 199. LEAGUE, supra note 119, at 18-19. 
 200. For example, a review of the editorial endorsements of the Minneapolis 
Star Tribune from election years 1988 through 2000 reveals the tilt these 
endorsements have taken.  The following results are listed in order of Democrat, 
Republican, and Independent (if present) candidate percentages taken as a whole 
from that 12 year time period: U.S. President, 100-0; U.S House, 73-25-2; U.S. 
Senate, 75-25; Governor, 33-67; Minnesota Legislature, 70-29-1.  The results are on 
file with author.  The extremely partisan commentary within these endorsements 
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editors of a newspaper supporting a philosophy on their editorial 
page, the electorate must be aware of that philosophy when 
attempting to acquire information through those very editorials. 
The lesson indeed may be that politics, at its base merely a 
marketplace of ideas, is inherent in everything around us, from an 
independent judiciary, to a news source attempting to educate us 
on that judiciary.  But just as the reader must know from what 
context he is reading, the voter must know for what principles he 
or she is voting. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the current debate over Minnesota’s choice of 
judicial selection, Minnesota’s founders chose a system whereby the 
citizens elect their judges.  To vote effectively, the people must be 
allowed to examine factors they feel are critical to determining 
judicial ability.  Factors that may be above and beyond what the 
Minnesota Supreme Court thinks are necessary or important.  By 
allowing Canon 5 to extinguish these rights, the Eighth Circuit’s 
inconsistent decision only serves to cement the status of incumbent 
judges, weaken their challengers, and thwart the ability of the 
citizens to place within the judiciary people who share their values. 
 
 
is typified with remarks such as those against the Republican challenger of 
Kathleen Sekhon, the Star Tribune’s endorsee.  “Those ideas – cutting taxes, 
restricting abortion, relaxing laws against carrying concealed weapons – won’t 
contribute much to bettering life in Minnesota.”  Editorial, MPLS. STAR TRIB., Oct. 
27, 1998, at A13. 
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